• Hypotheses: -Traditional convergence results will not hold -"Dominance Solvability" is too weak of a notion in low-information environments"
-"Overwhelmed solvability" is better - We have a nice pricing scheme that conveniently not only satisfies "overwhelmed solvability" but is unique in this respect (among a class of pricing algorithms)
• Open-ended:
How well do existing learning models capture behavior in this novel, real-time, uncertain environment?
Experimental Design
• Web Browser Implementation
Experimental subjects have an intuitive understanding of the low-information, dynamic environment on the web.
• Limited Information
The nature of the game, the number of players, and the payoff matrix are all unknown to the players
• Structural Changes
The underlying game is subject to structural changes (e.g. Demand Shocks)
• Continuous Time
Players may change strategies at any time
• Asynchrony
Players make decisions or change strategies at different intervals
Games Played
• Monopoly
• Dominance-Solvable Game
Cournot competition (linear demand)
• Overwhelmed-Solvable Game (Friedman and Shenker, 1996) Serial Cost Sharing (Moulin and Shenker, 1992) • Genetic-based Models
Modeled after evolutionary processes Evolutionary, Cellular attractor, etc.
• Heuristic-based / Backward looking Satisficing & Aspirations based models
Reinforcement learning
What heuristics are these models capturing?
All models incorporate the Law of Effect (Thorndike, 1898) An action with a positive reinforcement will be used more often Poorly-performing actions will be used less often
• History (memory, forgetfulness)
Law of Exercise (Thorndike, 1898; Watson, 1914 , Blackburn, 1936 Actions used more often carry stronger reinforcement
• Propensity-based models
• One-step (memoryless) models
• Reference Points (aspirations)

Whether a payoff is a positive or negative reinforcement depends on how the payoff compares to a point of reference
• Fixed reference point models
• Evolving reference point models
• Aspirations / satisficing models
• Experimentation (exploration)
Tradeoff between acquiring environmental information and taking advantage of information already acquired
• Undirected experimentation methods
• Directed experimentation (full sampling, recency)
• Diminishing vs. bounded probability of experimentation Subjects experiment frequently and in a methodical, autocorrelated fashion
• Subjects experiment 15% of the time
• "Fast" players, last two minutes of Monopoly Parameter Set 1, playing more than 10 away from equilibrium
• Experimentation is autocorrelated (Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998) 
Propensities: ρ t (i) = (1-γ)ρ t-1 (i) + (1-ε)(π t (i)-α t-1 ) ρ t (j) = (1-γ)ρ t-1 (i) + (ε/S)(π t (i)-α t-1 ) j≠i
ρ 0 is the initial propensity γ is a forgetfulness or recency parameter, and ε is the probability of experimentation
Reference Points:
α 0 is the initial reference point λ is the persistence of reference points Probability of Play:
Variants:
Roth-Erev Basic Model with a stability criterion If the environment changes, propensities are reset
Responsive Learning Automata (Friedman and Shenker, 1996) 
β captures the speed of learning, and ε is the probability of experimentation 
